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ABSTRACT. After reviewing the history and parameters of the scholarly
communications crisis, particularly in regard to skyrocketing prices for
journals in the natural sciences, the author reviews and rejects previously
attempted solutions. He then employs the principles of game theory in
proposing a new solution to the crisis. doi:10.1300/J204v03n03_04 [Article
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INTRODUCTION
The current system of scholarly communication is unsustainable and
change is unavoidable (Odlyzko, Transforming Scholarly Communica-
tion and Libraries). Various solutions such as alternative publishing mod-
els, open access, and library consortia have been tried and have achieved
mixed results. Given that the scholarly communication crisis is the result
of an imperfection in the serials publishing market, an economic solution
may be the answer.
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A Note on the History of Scholarly Periodicals
The forerunner of the modern scientific journal was the Philosoph-
ical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Phil Trans), circa
1665 (Guédon). Phil Trans was created by Henry Oldenburg, and was
essentially a correspondence transmitted among a few hundred noted
scientists spreading news of assorted observations and discoveries
(Gleick 75-76). However, the intent of the publication was not neces-
sarily to spread knowledge or information, rather to register intellec-
tual property (Guédon). Thus, a scientist could attach his name to a
natural “law” or discovery through publication in a peer-reviewed jour-
nal (Guédon). The journal’s power to publicize authors and their dis-
coveries gave publishers the power to grant the intellectual property to
the author (Guédon). In short, the periodical benefited the printer or
publisher more than the writer (Guédon).
While the number and quality of periodicals have increased since the
days of Henry Oldenburg, it was not until after World War II, in the
early 1950s, that the explosive growth in the number of periodical titles
created a problem (Ekman and Quandt 34-45). In order to understand
the explosive growth of periodicals, and natural science periodicals in
particular, we must first examine the scholarly communication process
as it exists in academe.
The Process of Scholarly Communication
Scholars share the results of their research with others through the
process of scholarly communication (Odlyzko, Transforming Scholarly
Communication and Libraries). The process entails two basic dimen-
sions: the actual production of the article (and journal within which the
article is published) and the academic environment in which the process
thrives. With respect to the actual production of the article, scholars typ-
ically seek out a peer-reviewed journal that publishes in their area of ex-
pertise. Before being accepted for publication, the journal article is
reviewed and revisions are suggested by other scholars with similar ex-
pertise. Once the editing process is complete, the article is published in
paper or electronic (or both) form and is available to other scholars and
members of the public. Generally, a person accessing the article will not
pay the publisher directly as the academic institution through which the
article is obtained pays an annual subscription fee to the publisher.
Typically, a publisher is responsible for the acquisition, development,
design, production, marketing, and distribution of the article (Odlyzko,
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Transforming Scholarly Communication and Libraries: Affordable Pub-
lishing). Consequently, the author’s role is limited to submitting the arti-
cle and addressing any editing issues; the publisher will be responsible
for all other aspects of the article’s publication. This is in keeping with the
model of scholarly publication as devised by Oldenburg in 1665, and as-
sures the publishers authority to grant intellectual property (Guédon).
There is a tremendous pressure to publish in the most prestigious jour-
nals in the scholar’s discipline, and to publish often. For scholars, produc-
tion of an article can have as much (or more) to do with attracting funding
to the academic institution, promotion, tenure, and other rewards as it does
with sharing the results of research with others (Budd 73-74).
Furthermore, citation-ranking publications such as those produced
by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) have only exacerbated
the problem (Guédon). The citation rankings are based upon frequency
of journal citation (Black 411-419). Accordingly, the more a journal is
cited, the more the journal is believed to be accepted or at least acknowl-
edged as an important resource (Black 411-419). The greater the rank-
ing of a journal, the more likely it is to be considered for acquisition
during collection development (Black 411-419). Thus, in an age of con-
strained library budgets, scholars prefer to publish in journals with higher
citation rankings as their work is more likely to be included in library
collections, and consequently, more likely to be cited in other scholarly
publications.
Publishers are also quite interested in having as many journals at the
top of the citation list as possible because the higher the publication is
on a citation list, the more likely it is to be purchased (Guédon). And if
publishers can assure that only their journals are acquired through the
use of bundling, they can manipulate the citation list as their journals
will rate higher because their journals are much more likely be cited by
scholars at the institutions receiving only their publications (Guédon).
THE CRISIS IN SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION
The vast increase in the number of published scholarly works, in
large measure due to the academic reward structure, has resulted in a
crisis in scholarly communication (Guédon). Between 1986 and 2003,
the cost of scholarly serials grew 215% according to statistics collected
by the Association of Research Libraries. In contrast, the rate of inflation
for the same time period, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, grew
at only 68%; additionally, there was a 138% increase in the number of
Chad Schatzle 39
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 b
y
 [
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
N
ev
ad
a 
L
as
 V
eg
as
] 
at
 1
4
:2
0
 2
7
 J
u
ly
 2
0
1
1
 
serial titles. Consequently, the cost increase combined with the increase
in the number of titles (even accounting for large increases in materials
purchasing budgets) has resulted in a reduction in the number of serials
purchased by academic institutions (Odlyzko, Transforming Scholarly
Communication and Libraries: Serials Pricing).
One possible solution to the scholarly communications crisis is to
eliminate the role of the commercial publisher, and some institutions
have made attempts to do exactly that. One such example of a system of
scholarly communication where the commercial publisher has been elimi-
nated is the arXiv archive. “arXiv is an e-print service in the fields of physics,
mathematics, non-linear science, computer science, and quantitative biol-
ogy” (arxiv.org). Paul Ginsparg created arXiv in 1991. Initially, arXiv had
only about a thousand users (Ginsparg). However, arXiv use has grown
tremendously and now boasts over 35,000 users worldwide (Ginsparg)
and over 200,000 electronic transactions per day (arXiv Web server us-
age for Feb. 26, 2006). Currently, Cornell University (with partial fund-
ing from the National Science Foundation) owns and operates arXiv
(arxiv.org). arXiv contains a number of highly respected journals that
are available for free download by anyone, and is particularly prized for
its collection of physics articles.
Collections similar to arXiv, such as First Monday and the Electronic
Journal of Combinatorics are also available. While the journals do apply
some pressure to the commerical serials publishers, they are unlikely to
correct the fundamental market problem; an inelastic market, that is, a mar-
ket that is not affected by pricing and vice versa (Guédon).
Libraries and universites have also created alliances that publish jour-
nals designed to compete directly with the large, costly journals sold
by commercial publishers (Guédon). One such example is the Scholarly
Publishing and Academic Resource Coalition (SPARC) (Transforming
Scholarly Communication and Libraries: Affordable Publishing). SPARC
produces journals that are designed to go head to head with particular
journals from commercial publishers. The SPARC journal may be free or
substantially cheaper than the commercial publisher’s journal (Guédon).
For example, SPARC produces Organic Letters (subscription price
$2,438), a journal designed to compete directly with Elsevier’s Tetra-
hedron Letters (subscription price $9,036) (Guédon). Interestingly, when
competitive journals are introduced, commercial publishers’ price in-
creases for that particular journal level off (Guédon). Regrettably,
SPARC must fight an uphill battle with each journal it launches (due to
the citation index problem as previously described), and given the breadth
of journals owned by commercial publishers, it is simply not feasible to
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go head to head with every journal (Guédon). In fact, SPARC-like jour-
nals may even exacerbate the scholarly communication crisis as libraries
will be faced with even more core journals to consider for purchase.
Moreover, SPARC attempts to add competition into the marketplace,
when an entire market overhaul is what is needed.
Another challenge to the commerical periodical publishers has come
from library consortia. Library consortia comprise libraries that have band-
ed together to pool their resources (Guédon). The theory behind the con-
sortium is that their members’ combined purchasing power will increase
their leverage vis-à-vis the commercial publishers (Guédon). Specifi-
cally, the libraries bargain as a group in an effort to force vendors to
make a global deal in which one vendor will receive all of the business
(Guédon).
One successful example of a consortium that has received positive
results is the Canadian National Site Licensing Project (CNSLP). CNSLP
is a library consortium that hoped to capitalize on libraries’ coopera-
tive abilities in areas such as interlibrary loans. CNSLP pooled their
resources, about 50 million Canadian dollars, and set up a negotiation
with commercial serials publishers. CNSLP would only bargain for full
collections (thus ensuring the global deal) and would keep a confiden-
tial list that ranked vendors in an effort to create uncertainty in the mar-
ket. The consortium would then only negotiate with vendors according
to the order of their confidential ranking, and unsuccessful negotiations
with vendors meant that the consortium just moved to the next vendor
for negotiations (Guédon).
Overall, CNSLP’s negotiations resulted in significant savings and a cap
on price increases; additionally, the increases in shared knowledge and col-
laboration, especially in the area of negotiating tactics and legal experience,
are seen as a positive outcome (Guédon). Consequently, library consortia
have had a direct impact on the cost of periodicals and provide an excellent
foundation for changing the commercial serial market.
GAME THEORY AND THE SCHOLARLY
COMMUNICATIONS CRISIS
As previously described, consortia have had an impact on commer-
cial publishers, particularly in the area of negotiations between the par-
ties; and as with any negotiation, price is a key issue. In the natural
sciences serials market, “Pricing is based on what the market will bear
not on the value of the commodity” (Bosch 107). Studies have shown that
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the price of a journal per 1,000 typed characters can vary tremendously,
indicating a disconnect between production costs and price (Guédon).
What’s more, the existence of only a handful of dominant suppliers
means that price competition is weak or almost non-existent, and is ex-
pected only to worsen as consolidation of the industry continues (Bosch
107-115). More still, marketing strategies such as “bundling,” used by
some of the largest suppliers, such as Elsevier, increase the costs of pe-
riodicals over time (Odlyzko, The Crisis in Scholarly Communication).
Bundling essentially makes it difficult to cancel any particular journal
without substantially increasing the costs of the remaining bundled
journals (Odlyzko, The Crisis in Scholarly Communication). As a re-
sult, it becomes nearly impossible to reduce the costs of journals even if
the number of journals subscribed to is reduced. Thus, pricing in the
natural science serials market is not driven by normal market forces
(Bosch 107-115), and in reality an oligopoly exists (an oligopoly exists
where control over most of a product is held by a small number of pro-
ducers or sellers) (“oligopoly, oligopsony” 294).
While consortia are headed in the right direction, much more could
be done. Enter game theory. Game theory was largely developed by John
von Neumann, perhaps one of the most gifted mathematicians ever to
have lived, and economist Oskar Morgenstern (Harford 156-158). Their
seminal text, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, was published
in 1944 (Harford 158).
In the most general sense, game theory “attempts to explain the be-
havior of ‘players,’ where the optimal moves of these players depend
critically upon the moves taken by other players” (Graham 67). The
“players” in the serials game are the serials producers or sellers (e.g.,
Elsevier, Gale) and the serials purchasers (e.g., academic libraries).
Game theory has many variations, depending on the type of “game” or
factual situation involved. For our purposes, we will concentrate on the
variation of game theory known as “non-cooperative” game theory. In
non-cooperative game theory, “it is assumed that each player will maxi-
mize its (sic) own interests, as opposed to the collective interests of a
group of players. It is not ruled out, however, that these interests might
coincide: an individual player might in fact cooperate with other play-
ers. If, however, this happens, it is because the player chooses to coop-
erate out of self-interest, rather than because the player is bound by
some sort of obligation that is enforced by an external agent” (Graham
67). In the case of scholarly communication, the serials producers or
sellers are the “players” that seek to maximize their own interests.
Clearly, the library consortia are engaged in cooperative behavior.
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Non-cooperative game theory is useful where the strategic behavior of
firms in markets with a limited number of sellers (such as the natural sci-
ences serials market) is sought to be understood (Graham 67-83). Once
understood, a different form of negotiation between sellers and buyers
can be created that is more beneficial to buyers, in this case, libraries.
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
As previously stated, libraries have attempted to cut out the commer-
cial publisher altogether, an interesting idea, but unlikely to work in such
a profitable industry (due to market inelasticity). Libraries have also at-
tempted to inject a measure of competition into the natural sciences seri-
als market by banding together and creating academic journals that
compete with high-priced commercially published serials, especially in
the natural sciences. But ultimately, this tactic will also fail as it does not
change the nature of the market, it only adds a small dimension of compe-
tition. Coalitions such as SPARC have made some headway in bringing
about a reduction in the costs of some journals, but more importantly,
such coalitions demonstrate the need for greatly increased market compe-
tition (Guédon). Unfortunately, re-creating SPARC-like alliances may be
impracticable given the breadth of the serials industry. Finally, librarians
have created coalitions to increase their collective spending and bargain-
ing power. The coalitions are a step in the right direction, but could be
vastly improved by applying game theory.
In order to introduce much-needed competition into the serials indus-
try, consortia such as the CNSLP should be set up in the United States–
the larger the consortium the better. As with CNSLP, the consortium
would only bargain for full collections (Guédon). Likewise, the consor-
tium must attempt to create uncertainty in the market, as CNLP did by
keeping its rankings confidential (Guédon). However, the new consor-
tium should use an auction system to achieve uncertainty.
Why an auction? According to game theory, if an auction attracts even
one additional bidder, the auction will raise more money than any other
possible negotiating arrangement (Harford 167). In this case, the consor-
tium would attempt to get access to the largest-possible collection for a
set amount of dollars, in essence raising the largest-possible collection
size. The auction would be structured in a way similar to the auction of
United Kingdom (UK) cell phone spectrum rights, widely hailed as a very
successful auction from the government’s perspective (Harford 168-175).
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In the UK auction, bids were taken remotely over the Internet for five
licenses to use available UK cell phone spectrum rights. The beauty of
the auction was that competition for any one license would drive up
competition for the remaining licenses, because a firm that was not the
leading bidder on any particular license had to keep bidding on that li-
cense or any other license, or withdraw from the auction. This resulted
in firms continuing to bid on the license that offered the best value at
that moment. Consequently, spirited competition over any particular li-
cense would raise its price relative to the other license, which would then
look like a bargain. Ultimately, the bidders would never know which bid
would win any particular license and therefore had to make sure they
were always satisfied with their position relative to all of the licenses.
The best strategy to achieve this is to place a winning (or the highest)
bid on the license currently with the most value, relative to the other li-
censes. If none of the licenses look like a good value, the bidder would
withdraw (Harford 169-170).
Additionally, the auction ran in short rounds of about half-hour in-
tervals in which bidders had to submit new bids or withdraw from the
auction. Finally, the bid results were quickly posted on the Internet, in
effect forcing the auction to take place in a public forum (Harford 168).
In order to create a similar situation for the consortia, the body of
journals would be segmented. For example, the science journals such as
physics, biology, chemistry, geology, mathematics, medicine, and engi-
neering would be segmented into groups. Journals such as education,
music, language, literature, history, and sociology would be segmented
into another group. Likewise, journals relating to business, economics,
and law would be segmented into yet another group. A determination as
to the optimal number of group members would be made by various trial
runs of the auction.
The consortium would determine the number, type, quality, and
amount of access to journals the consortium currently had. It would then
determine the group’s expenditure for the journals. Once arriving at that
figure, the consortium would offer that amount of money, X dollars, as
the amount of money the serial publishers would be asking for in ex-
change for their journals. Additionally, to sweeten the deal, the contract
would remain in effect for five years, at the same yearly amount. For ex-
ample, with a very large consortium, the amount of money in play
would be $200 million ($1 billion over a five-year period), broken up
among the various groups of journals (i.e., $120 million for the science
journals, $40 million for the humanities journals, and $40 million for
the business and legal journals). Clearly, competition for the science
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journals would be fierce, and companies would vie to offer the most
attractive journal packages with regard to number, type, quality, and
amount of access. However, even if their bid were not the highest, the
firm would be forced to bid on another group of journals or face with-
drawal from the auction. Withdrawal from the auction means that the
company can no longer bid on any of the groups and will essentially be
unable to sell to the consortium for the next five years, thereby passing
on many millions of dollars that will be paid to the winning bidder.
Thus, a company will face pressure to bid continually on one of the jour-
nal groupings until it has offered all of its collection and has nothing
more to offer. Ultimately, the consortium’s goal will be to spend no
more than the previous year (and lock in prices for the next five years)
and end up with more journals than before.
Additionally, holding the auction only once every five years has the
added benefit of increasing stability to the consortia’s collection as well
as slowing the learning curve of auction bidders (Guédon).
It is possible that bidders could offer very little in the way of journal ac-
cess, but given the amount of money the successful bidder would earn, it
would seem foolish not to try and outbid the competition, especially for
companies that are largely selling access to an asset (i.e., journals) that it
already possesses. Essentially, failure to bargain in good faith would be
akin to throwing money (and five years worth, at that) out of the window.
For-profit companies, especially those with shareholders, would be under
intense pressure to win the bid given the large amount of money involved
and the winner-take-all design of the auction. Additionally, the possibil-
ity exists for the smaller companies to score a major coup by winning the
auction. This would create a stronger competitor for the larger companies
in the future, which would result in greater competition in the market,
much to the delight of the consortium.
Another possibility is that the major players in the market refuse to
play and simply do not show up at the auction (although this is unlikely
for fear of creating stronger competition as outlined earlier). Should this
happen, there would be a dramatic increase in the use of SPARC and
SPARC-like journals, and a torrent of scholars clamoring to publish in
those journals. After all, who would want to publish in a journal that
was not accessible to a large section of academe (especially given the
impact of ISI as discussed earlier)?
A standoff would be unfortunate for both the bidders and the consor-
tium. However, given that the consortium is largely made up of academic
and municipal entities, who are by their nature slow to react, the pub-
lishers, whose stock may be under daily scrutiny in the market, would
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likely blink first. Moreover, serials publishers do not have a product that
can be sold to another market if the academic market goes bust; the aca-
demic market is their only market. Even a standoff, as long as it were
temporary, would entirely change the serials publishing market for the
better, and more rosy scenarios would allow the consortium to lock in
prices for five years with access to more journals than before.
CONCLUSION
The current state of scholarly communication is in need of change. The
greatly increased cost of serials combined with the increase in the number
of titles has resulted in a reduction in the number of serials an academic
institution can reasonably purchase. Libraries have begun to address the
crisis in serials pricing by removing the commercial publisher from the
process entirely. Libraries have instituted open-access alternatives, which
have been only moderately successful. Libraries have also banded together
in library consortia, whereby serials purchases are made by a group of li-
braries. Consortia allow libraries to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the
commercial publisher, and negotiate a global deal in which one vendor
will receive all of the business. Consortia have had promising results, and
with the application of game theory, whereby consortia auction off their
purchase budgets to various producers or sellers, libraries can cap spend-
ing as well as increase access to serials.
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